IPTPS '01 Revised Papers from the First International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems
Security Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems
Security Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems
SAFECOMP '08 Proceedings of the 27th international conference on Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security
Principles of Embedded Networked Systems Design
Principles of Embedded Networked Systems Design
Experimental Security Analysis of a Modern Automobile
SP '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Secure automotive on-board protocols: a case of over-the-air firmware updates
Nets4Cars/Nets4Trains'11 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Communication technologies for vehicles
Comprehensive experimental analyses of automotive attack surfaces
SEC'11 Proceedings of the 20th USENIX conference on Security
What we can learn from API security
Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Security Protocols
Jamming sensor networks: attack and defense strategies
IEEE Network: The Magazine of Global Internetworking
Design, implementation, and evaluation of a vehicular hardware security module
ICISC'11 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Information Security and Cryptology
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Current automotive systems contain security solutions provided as singular solutions. Security mechanisms are implemented for each automotive function individually. This individual security design leads to several problems: combining several functions that are for its own secure may not result in a secure system. Furthermore, the combination of functions might also lead to situations, where mechanisms erroneously detect a security threat. This paper argues that new features, such as Car-2-Car communication or autonomous driving, will result in new information and communication technology (ICT) architectures of cars. The paper will outline basic properties of this architecture and summarize resulting security threads. We will argue that security needs to be treated in a holistic way and that the design must be suitable for adaptive, multiple independent levels of security (MILS) architecture.