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Communications of the ACM
Deep Packet Filter with Dedicated Logic and Read Only Memories
FCCM '04 Proceedings of the 12th Annual IEEE Symposium on Field-Programmable Custom Computing Machines
A platform for RFID security and privacy administration
LISA '06 Proceedings of the 20th conference on Large Installation System Administration
Pacemakers and Implantable Cardiac Defibrillators: Software Radio Attacks and Zero-Power Defenses
SP '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
A Practical Attack on the MIFARE Classic
CARDIS '08 Proceedings of the 8th IFIP WG 8.8/11.2 international conference on Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications
LiveLab: measuring wireless networks and smartphone users in the field
ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review
Hijacking power and bandwidth from the mobile phone's audio interface
Proceedings of the First ACM Symposium on Computing for Development
They can hear your heartbeats: non-invasive security for implantable medical devices
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2011 conference
An amulet for trustworthy wearable mHealth
Proceedings of the Twelfth Workshop on Mobile Computing Systems & Applications
Plug-n-trust: practical trusted sensing for mhealth
Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Mobile systems, applications, and services
Software abstractions for trusted sensors
Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Mobile systems, applications, and services
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Near Field Communication (NFC) on mobile phones presents new opportunities and threats. While NFC is radically changing how we pay for merchandise, it opens a pandora's box of ways in which it may be misused by unscrupulous individuals. This could include malicious NFC tags that seek to compromise a mobile phone, malicious readers that try to generate fake mobile payment transactions or steal valuable financial information, and others. In this work, we look at how to protect mobile phones from these threats while not being vulnerable to them. We design a small form-factor "patch", EnGarde, that can be stuck on the back of a phone to provide the capability to jam malicious interactions. EnGarde is entirely passive and harvests power through the same NFC source that it guards, which makes our hardware design minimalist, and facilitates eventual integration with a phone. We tackle key technical challenges in this design including operating across a range of NFC protocols, jamming at extremely low power, harvesting sufficient power for perpetual operation while having minimal impact on the phone's battery, designing an intelligent jammer that blocks only when specific blacklisted behavior is detected, and importantly, the ability to do all this without compromising user experience when the phone interacts with a legitimate external NFC device.