The SLam calculus: programming with secrecy and integrity
POPL '98 Proceedings of the 25th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
JFlow: practical mostly-static information flow control
Proceedings of the 26th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
A sound type system for secure flow analysis
Journal of Computer Security
A lattice model of secure information flow
Communications of the ACM
Process algebra and non-interference
Journal of Computer Security
Information flow inference for ML
POPL '02 Proceedings of the 29th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Secure Information Flow and CPS
ESOP '01 Proceedings of the 10th European Symposium on Programming Languages and Systems
PLILP '96 Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Programming Languages: Implementations, Logics, and Programs
Stack-based access control and secure information flow
Journal of Functional Programming
Fabric: a platform for secure distributed computation and storage
Proceedings of the ACM SIGOPS 22nd symposium on Operating systems principles
Well-going programs can be typed
TLCA'03 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Typed lambda calculi and applications
Noninterference through Secure Multi-execution
SP '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Assumptions and Guarantees for Compositional Noninterference
CSF '11 Proceedings of the 2011 IEEE 24th Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Language-based information-flow security
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
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Ensuring that software protects its users' privacy has become an increasingly pressing challenge. Requiring software to be certified with a secure type system is one enforcement mechanism. Protecting privacy with type systems, however, has only been studied for programs written entirely in a single language, whereas software is frequently implemented using multiple languages specialized for different tasks. This paper presents an approach that facilitates reasoning over composed languages. It outlines sufficient requirements for the component languages to lift privacy guarantees of the component languages to well-typed composed programs, significantly lowering the burden necessary to certify that such composite programs safe. The approach relies on computability and security-level separability. This paper defines completeness with respect to secure computations and formally establishes conditions sufficient for a security-typed language to be complete. We demonstrate the applicability of the results with a case study of three seminal security-typed languages.