A randomized protocol for signing contracts
Communications of the ACM
All-or-nothing disclosure of secrets
Proceedings on Advances in cryptology---CRYPTO '86
Commodity-based cryptography (extended abstract)
STOC '97 Proceedings of the twenty-ninth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Communications of the ACM
New Results on Unconditionally Secure Distributed Oblivious Transfer
SAC '02 Revised Papers from the 9th Annual International Workshop on Selected Areas in Cryptography
Practical Quantum Oblivious Transfer
CRYPTO '91 Proceedings of the 11th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
On Unconditionally Secure Distributed Oblivious Transfer
INDOCRYPT '02 Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Cryptology: Progress in Cryptology
Distributed Oblivious Transfer
ASIACRYPT '00 Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Efficient distributed 1 out of n oblivious transfer
Efficient distributed 1 out of n oblivious transfer
Elements of Information Theory (Wiley Series in Telecommunications and Signal Processing)
Elements of Information Theory (Wiley Series in Telecommunications and Signal Processing)
On Unconditionally Secure Distributed Oblivious Transfer
Journal of Cryptology
Communication-efficient distributed oblivious transfer
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
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The unconditionally secure Distributed Oblivious Transfer (DOT) protocol presented by Blundo, D'Arco, De Santis, and Stinson at SAC 2002 allows a receiver to contact k servers and obtain one out of n secrets held by a sender. Once the protocol has been executed, the sender does not know which secret was selected by the receiver and the receiver knows nothing of the secrets she did not choose. In addition, the receiver's privacy is guaranteed against a coalition of k−1 servers and similarly, the sender's security is guaranteed against a coalition of k−1 servers. However, after the receiver has obtained a secret, she is able to learn all secrets by corrupting one server only. In addition, an external mechanism is required to prevent the receiver from contacting more than k servers. The one-round DOT protocol we propose is information-theoretically secure, allows the receiver to contact k servers or more, and guarantees the sender's security, even if the receiver corrupts k−1 servers after having obtained a secret.