Privacy preserving auctions and mechanism design
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A Cryptographic Solution to a Game Theoretic Problem
CRYPTO '00 Proceedings of the 20th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Revealing information while preserving privacy
Proceedings of the twenty-second ACM SIGMOD-SIGACT-SIGART symposium on Principles of database systems
Practical privacy: the SuLQ framework
Proceedings of the twenty-fourth ACM SIGMOD-SIGACT-SIGART symposium on Principles of database systems
Rational Secure Computation and Ideal Mechanism Design
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Mechanism Design via Differential Privacy
FOCS '07 Proceedings of the 48th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Practical secrecy-preserving, verifiably correct and trustworthy auctions
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
Approximate privacy: foundations and quantification (extended abstract)
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Boosting and Differential Privacy
FOCS '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE 51st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Approximately optimal mechanism design via differential privacy
Proceedings of the 3rd Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference
Calibrating noise to sensitivity in private data analysis
TCC'06 Proceedings of the Third conference on Theory of Cryptography
Privacy-aware mechanism design
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
The Exponential Mechanism for Social Welfare: Private, Truthful, and Nearly Optimal
FOCS '12 Proceedings of the 2012 IEEE 53rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Is privacy compatible with truthfulness?
Proceedings of the 4th conference on Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Mechanism design in large games: incentives and privacy
Proceedings of the 5th conference on Innovations in theoretical computer science
Redrawing the boundaries on purchasing data from privacy-sensitive individuals
Proceedings of the 5th conference on Innovations in theoretical computer science
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Recent work has constructed economic mechanisms that are both truthful and differentially private. In these mechanisms, privacy is treated separately from the truthfulness; it is not incorporated in players' utility functions (and doing so has been shown to lead to non-truthfulness in some cases). In this work, we propose a new, general way of modelling privacy in players' utility functions. Specifically, we only assume that if an outcome o has the property that any report of player i would have led to o with approximately the same probability, then o has small privacy cost to player i. We give three mechanisms that are truthful with respect to our modelling of privacy: for an election between two candidates, for a discrete version of the facility location problem, and for a general social choice problem with discrete utilities (via a VCG-like mechanism). As the number n of players increases, the social welfare achieved by our mechanisms approaches optimal (as a fraction of n).