Brief announcement: scalable anonymous communication with byzantine adversary

Authors:
Josh Karlin;Joud Khoury;Jared Saia;Mahdi Zamani
Affiliations:
Google Inc., Cambridge, MA, USA;Raytheon BBN Technologies, Cambridge, MA, USA;University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM, USA;University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM, USA
Venue:
Proceedings of the 2013 ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Year:
2013

Citing 5
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Abstract

We describe an algorithm for fully-anonymous broadcast in large-scale networks. The protocol is similar to the dining cryptographers networks (DC-Nets) in that both are based on secure multi-party computation (MPC) techniques. However, we address the weaknesses of DC-Nets, which are poor scalability and vulnerability to jamming attacks. When compared to the state-of-the-art, our protocol reduces the total bit complexity from O(n2) to Õ(n) per anonymous message sent in a network of size n at the expense of an increase in total latency from O(1) to polylog(n). Our protocol can tolerate up to 1/3 dishonest parties, which are controlled by a static computationally-unbounded Byzantine adversary.