Efficient software-based fault isolation
SOSP '93 Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
The geometry of innocent flesh on the bone: return-into-libc without function calls (on the x86)
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Native Client: A Sandbox for Portable, Untrusted x86 Native Code
SP '09 Proceedings of the 2009 30th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
On lightweight mobile phone application certification
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Apex: extending Android permission model and enforcement with user-defined runtime constraints
ASIACCS '10 Proceedings of the 5th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security
TaintDroid: an information-flow tracking system for realtime privacy monitoring on smartphones
OSDI'10 Proceedings of the 9th USENIX conference on Operating systems design and implementation
Adapting software fault isolation to contemporary CPU architectures
USENIX Security'10 Proceedings of the 19th USENIX conference on Security
Permission re-delegation: attacks and defenses
SEC'11 Proceedings of the 20th USENIX conference on Security
Quire: lightweight provenance for smart phone operating systems
SEC'11 Proceedings of the 20th USENIX conference on Security
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Aurasium: practical policy enforcement for Android applications
Security'12 Proceedings of the 21st USENIX conference on Security symposium
Jekyll on iOS: when benign apps become evil
SEC'13 Proceedings of the 22nd USENIX conference on Security
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Apple iOS is one of the most popular mobile operating systems. As its core security technology, iOS provides application sandboxing but assigns a generic sandboxing profile to every third-party application. However, recent attacks and incidents with benign applications demonstrate that this design decision is vulnerable to crucial privacy and security breaches, allowing applications (either benign or malicious) to access contacts, photos, and device IDs. Moreover, the dynamic character of iOS apps written in Objective-C renders the currently proposed static analysis tools less useful. In this paper, we aim to address the open problem of preventing (not only detecting) privacy leaks and simultaneously strengthening security against runtime attacks on iOS. Compared to similar research work on the open Android, realizing such a system for the closed-source iOS is highly involved. We present the design and implementation of PSiOS, a tool that features a novel policy enforcement framework for iOS. It provides fine-grained, application-specific, and user/administrator defined sandboxing for each third-party application without requiring access to the application source code. Our reference implementation deploys control-flow integrity based on the recently proposed MoCFI (Mobile CFI) framework that only protects applications against runtime attacks. We evaluated several popular iOS applications (e.g., Facebook, WhatsApp) to demonstrate the efficiency and effectiveness of PSiOS.