The Design of Rijndael
Provably Secure and Practical Identification Schemes and Corresponding Signature Schemes
CRYPTO '92 Proceedings of the 12th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Universal classes of hash functions (Extended Abstract)
STOC '77 Proceedings of the ninth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Reclaiming Space from Duplicate Files in a Serverless Distributed File System
ICDCS '02 Proceedings of the 22 nd International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS'02)
Foundations of Cryptography: Volume 2, Basic Applications
Foundations of Cryptography: Volume 2, Basic Applications
Key management for multi-user encrypted databases
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM workshop on Storage security and survivability
Pors: proofs of retrievability for large files
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Provable data possession at untrusted stores
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Fuzzy Extractors: How to Generate Strong Keys from Biometrics and Other Noisy Data
SIAM Journal on Computing
Proceedings of the 4th ACM international workshop on Storage security and survivability
Remote Integrity Check with Dishonest Storage Server
ESORICS '08 Proceedings of the 13th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security: Computer Security
Compact Proofs of Retrievability
ASIACRYPT '08 Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Leakage-Resilient Public-Key Cryptography in the Bounded-Retrieval Model
CRYPTO '09 Proceedings of the 29th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Software performance of universal hash functions
EUROCRYPT'99 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Side Channels in Cloud Services: Deduplication in Cloud Storage
IEEE Security and Privacy
Fast and secure laptop backups with encrypted de-duplication
LISA'10 Proceedings of the 24th international conference on Large installation system administration
Secure deduplication on mobile devices
Proceedings of the 2011 Workshop on Open Source and Design of Communication
Leftover Hash Lemma, revisited
CRYPTO'11 Proceedings of the 31st annual conference on Advances in cryptology
Proofs of ownership in remote storage systems
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Secure and efficient proof of storage with deduplication
Proceedings of the second ACM conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy
On the (im)possibility of obfuscating programs
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Private data deduplication protocols in cloud storage
Proceedings of the 27th Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Computing
Incremental deterministic public-key encryption
EUROCRYPT'12 Proceedings of the 31st Annual international conference on Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Towards efficient proofs of retrievability
Proceedings of the 7th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security
Boosting efficiency and security in proof of ownership for deduplication
Proceedings of the 7th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security
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Recently, Halevi et al. (CCS '11) proposed a cryptographic primitive called proofs of ownership (PoW) to enhance security of client-side deduplication in cloud storage. In a proof of ownership scheme, any owner of the same file F can prove to the cloud storage that he/she owns file F in a robust and efficient way, in the bounded leakage setting where a certain amount of efficiently-extractable information about file F is leaked. Following this work, we propose a secure client-side deduplication scheme, with the following advantages: our scheme protects data confidentiality (and some partial information) against both outside adversaries and honest-but-curious cloud storage server, while Halevi et al. trusts cloud storage server in data confidentiality; our scheme is proved secure w.r.t. any distribution with sufficient min-entropy, while Halevi et al. (the last and the most practical construction) is particular to a specific type of distribution (a generalization of "block-fixing" distribution) of input files. The cost of our improvements is that we adopt a weaker leakage setting: We allow a bounded amount one-time leakage of a target file before our scheme starts to execute, while Halevi et al. allows a bounded amount multi-time leakage of the target file before and after their scheme starts to execute. To the best of our knowledge, previous works on client-side deduplication prior Halevi et al. do not consider any leakage setting.