Extensive--form games with heterogeneous populations

  • Authors:

  • Nicola Gatti;Fabio Panozzo;Marcello Restelli

  • Affiliations:

  • Politecnico di Milano, Milan, Italy;Politecnico di Milano, Milan, Italy;Politecnico di Milano, Milan, Italy

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
  • Year:
  • 2013

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Abstract

The adoption of Nash equilibrium (NE) in real--world settings is often impractical due to its too restrictive assumptions. Game theory and artificial intelligence provide alternative solution concepts. When knowledge about opponents utilities and types is not available, the appropriate solution concept for extensive--form games is the self--confirming equilibrium (SCE), which relaxes NE allowing agents to have incorrect beliefs off the equilibrium path. In this paper, we extend SCEs to capture situations in which a two--agent extensive--form game is played by heterogeneous populations of individuals that repeatedly match (e.g., eBay).