Stable internet routing without global coordination
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
The stable paths problem and interdomain routing
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Modeling adoptability of secure BGP protocols
SIGMETRICS '06/Performance '06 Proceedings of the joint international conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems
Origin authentication in interdomain routing
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
A study of prefix hijacking and interception in the internet
Proceedings of the 2007 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Rationality and traffic attraction: incentives for honest path announcements in bgp
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2008 conference on Data communication
Cyclops: the AS-level connectivity observatory
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
Proceedings of the 9th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement conference
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2010 conference
How secure are secure interdomain routing protocols
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2010 conference
Let the market drive deployment: a strategy for transitioning to BGP security
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2011 conference
Twelve years in the evolution of the internet ecosystem
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Secure Border Gateway Protocol (S-BGP)
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Brief announcement: network-destabilizing attacks
PODC '12 Proceedings of the 2012 ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Anatomy of a large european IXP
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2012 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communication
Provable security of S-BGP and other path vector protocols: model, analysis and extensions
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
On the risk of misbehaving RPKI authorities
Proceedings of the Twelfth ACM Workshop on Hot Topics in Networks
A survey of interdomain routing policies
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
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As the rollout of secure route origin authentication with the RPKI slowly gains traction among network operators, there is a push to standardize secure path validation for BGP (i.e., S*BGP: S-BGP, soBGP, BGPSEC, etc.). Origin authentication already does much to improve routing security. Moreover, the transition to S*BGP is expected to be long and slow, with S*BGP coexisting in "partial deployment" alongside BGP for a long time. We therefore use theoretical and experimental approach to study the security benefits provided by partially-deployed S*BGP, vis-a-vis those already provided by origin authentication. Because routing policies have a profound impact on routing security, we use a survey of 100 network operators to find the policies that are likely to be most popular during partial S*BGP deployment. We find that S*BGP provides only meagre benefits over origin authentication when these popular policies are used. We also study the security benefits of other routing policies, provide prescriptive guidelines for partially-deployed S*BGP, and show how interactions between S*BGP and BGP can introduce new vulnerabilities into the routing system.