Wireless Communication Is in APX
ICALP '09 Proceedings of the 36th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming: Part I
Spectrum markets: motivation, challenges, and implications
IEEE Communications Magazine
Approximation algorithms for secondary spectrum auctions
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Secondary spectrum auctions for symmetric and submodular bidders
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Approximation algorithms for wireless link scheduling with flexible data rates
ESA'12 Proceedings of the 20th Annual European conference on Algorithms
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We present algorithms for implementing local spectrum redistribution in wireless networks using a mechanism design approach. For example, in single-hop request scheduling, secondary users are modeled as rational agents that have private utility when getting assigned a channel for successful transmission. We present a simple algorithmic technique that allows to turn existing and future approximation algorithms and heuristics into truthful mechanisms for a large variety of networking problems. Our approach works with virtually all known interference models in the literature, including the physical model of interference based on SINR. It allows to address single-hop and multi-hop scheduling, routing, and even more general assignment and allocation problems. Our mechanisms are randomized and represent the first universally-truthful mechanisms for these problems with rigorous worst-case guarantees on the solution quality. In this way, our mechanisms can be used to obtain guaranteed solution quality even with risk-averse or risk-seeking bidders, for which existing approaches fail.