Hash functions based on block ciphers: a synthetic approach
CRYPTO '93 Proceedings of the 13th annual international cryptology conference on Advances in cryptology
A Tutorial on Support Vector Machines for Pattern Recognition
Data Mining and Knowledge Discovery
CRYPTO '02 Proceedings of the 22nd Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Power Analysis Attacks: Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards (Advances in Information Security)
Power Analysis Attacks: Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards (Advances in Information Security)
Side Channel Analysis of Some Hash Based MACs: A Response to SHA-3 Requirements
ICICS '08 Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Information and Communications Security
Algebraic Side-Channel Attacks on the AES: Why Time also Matters in DPA
CHES '09 Proceedings of the 11th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Side-channel analysis of six SHA-3 candidates
CHES'10 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
An evaluation of hash functions on a power analysis resistant processor architecture
WISTP'11 Proceedings of the 5th IFIP WG 11.2 international conference on Information security theory and practice: security and privacy of mobile devices in wireless communication
Side channel attacks against HMACs based on block-cipher based hash functions
ACISP'06 Proceedings of the 11th Australasian conference on Information Security and Privacy
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At the cutting edge of today's security research and development, the SHA-3 competition evaluates a new secure hashing standard in succession to SHA-2. The five remaining candidates of the SHA-3 competition are BLAKE, Grøstl, JH, Keccak, and Skein. While the main focus was on the algorithmic security of the candidates, a side channel analysis has only been performed for BLAKE and Grøstl [1]. In order to equally evaluate all candidates, we identify side channel attacks on JH-MAC, Keccak-MAC, and Skein-MAC and demonstrate the applicability of the attacks by attacking their respective reference implementation. Additionally, we revisit the side channel analysis of Grøstl and introduce a profiling based side channel attack, which emphasizes the importance of side channel resistant hash functions by recovering the input to the hash function using only the measured power consumption.