A fistful of bitcoins: characterizing payments among men with no names
Proceedings of the 2013 conference on Internet measurement conference
Optimally private access control
Proceedings of the 12th ACM workshop on Workshop on privacy in the electronic society
Pinocchio coin: building zerocoin from a succinct pairing-based proof system
Proceedings of the First ACM workshop on Language support for privacy-enhancing technologies
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Bitcoin is the first e-cash system to see widespread adoption. While Bitcoin offers the potential for new types of financial interaction, it has significant limitations regarding privacy. Specifically, because the Bitcoin transaction log is completely public, users' privacy is protected only through the use of pseudonyms. In this paper we propose Zerocoin, a cryptographic extension to Bitcoin that augments the protocol to allow for fully anonymous currency transactions. Our system uses standard cryptographic assumptions and does not introduce new trusted parties or otherwise change the security model of Bitcoin. We detail Zerocoin's cryptographic construction, its integration into Bitcoin, and examine its performance both in terms of computation and impact on the Bitcoin protocol.