Parallel and distributed computation: numerical methods
Parallel and distributed computation: numerical methods
Competition and Efficiency in Congested Markets
Mathematics of Operations Research
ICN '07 Proceedings of the Sixth International Conference on Networking
Dynamics of competition between incumbent and emerging network technologies
Proceedings of the 3rd international workshop on Economics of networked systems
Deployment options for femtocells and their impact on existing macrocellular networks
Bell Labs Technical Journal - 4G Wireless Technologies
GLOBECOM'09 Proceedings of the 28th IEEE conference on Global telecommunications
On the viability of paris metro pricing for communication and service networks
INFOCOM'10 Proceedings of the 29th conference on Information communications
Traffic pattern based resource hopping schemes of femto base stations
CCNC'10 Proceedings of the 7th IEEE conference on Consumer communications and networking conference
Investment and Market Structure in Industries with Congestion
Operations Research
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Cognitive radio: brain-empowered wireless communications
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Pricing and revenue sharing strategies for Internet service providers
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
A survey of smart data pricing: Past proposals, current plans, and future trends
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
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Focusing on a femtocell communications market, we study the entrant network service provider's (NSP's) long-term decision: whether to enter the market and which spectrum sharing technology to select to maximize its profit. This long-term decision is closely related to the entrant's pricing strategy and the users' aggregate demand, which we model as medium-term and short-term decisions, respectively. We consider two markets, one with no incumbent and the other with one incumbent. For both markets, we show the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium point in the user subscription dynamics and provide a sufficient condition for the convergence of the dynamics. For the market with no incumbent, we derive upper and lower bounds on the optimal price and market share that maximize the entrant's revenue, based on which the entrant selects an available technology to maximize its long-term profit. For the market with one incumbent, we model competition between the two NSPs as a noncooperative game, in which the incumbent and the entrant choose their market shares independently, and provide a sufficient condition that guarantees the existence of at least one pure Nash equilibrium. Finally, we formalize the problem of entry and spectrum-sharing scheme selection for the entrant and provide numerical results to complement our analysis.