Data networks
Auction-based spectrum sharing
Mobile Networks and Applications
A new pricing model for next generation spectrum access
TAPAS '06 Proceedings of the first international workshop on Technology and policy for accessing spectrum
Towards real-time dynamic spectrum auctions
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Revenue generation for truthful spectrum auction in dynamic spectrum access
Proceedings of the tenth ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
An economic framework for dynamic spectrum access and service pricing
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Optimal Transmission Strategies for Dynamic Spectrum Access in Cognitive Radio Networks
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
Spot pricing of secondary spectrum access in wireless cellular networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Pricing under constraints in access networks: revenue maximization and congestion management
INFOCOM'10 Proceedings of the 29th conference on Information communications
Delay analysis for cognitive radio networks with random access: a fluid queue view
INFOCOM'10 Proceedings of the 29th conference on Information communications
Investment and Pricing with Spectrum Uncertainty: A Cognitive Operator's Perspective
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
Price dynamics in competitive agile spectrum access markets
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
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This paper investigates pricing-based spectrum access control in cognitive radio networks, where primary users (PUs) sell the temporarily unused spectrum and secondary users (SUs) compete via random access for such spectrum opportunities. Compared to existing market-based approaches with centralized scheduling, pricing-based spectrum management with random access provides a platform for SUs contending for spectrum access and is amenable to decentralized implementation due to its low complexity. We focus on two market models, one with a monopoly PU market and the other with a multiple-PU market. For the monopoly PU market model, we devise decentralized pricing-based spectrum access mechanisms that enable SUs to contend for channel usage. Specifically, we first consider SUs contending via slotted Aloha. Since the revenue maximization problem therein is nonconvex, we characterize the corresponding Pareto-optimal region and obtain a Pareto-optimal solution that maximizes the SUs' throughput subject to their budget constraints. To mitigate the spectrum underutilization due to the "price of contention," we revisit the problem where SUs contend via CSMA, which results in more efficient spectrum utilization and higher revenue. We then study the tradeoff between the PU's utility and its revenue when the PU's salable spectrum is controllable. Next, for the multiple-PU market model, we cast the competition among PUs as a three-stage Stackelberg game, where each SU selects a PU's channel to maximize its throughput. We explore the existence and the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium, in terms of access prices and the spectrum offered to SUs, and develop an iterative algorithm for strategy adaptation to achieve the Nash equilibrium. Our findings reveal that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium when the number of PUs is less than a threshold determined by the budgets and elasticity of SUs.