IEEE Transactions on Communications
A distributed coalition formation framework for fair user cooperation in wireless networks
IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
Grouping Algorithm for Partner Selection in Cooperative Transmission
Wireless Personal Communications: An International Journal
Joint Relay Selection and Power Allocation for Cooperative Cellular Networks
Wireless Personal Communications: An International Journal
Maximizing Cooperative Diversity Energy Gain for Wireless Networks
IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
Semi-Distributed User Relaying Algorithm for Amplify-and-Forward Wireless Relay Networks
IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
A game-theoretic analysis of decode-and-forward user cooperation
IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications - Part 2
Cooperative communications with relay-selection: when to cooperate and whom to cooperate with?
IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
Cooperative diversity in wireless networks: Efficient protocols and outage behavior
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Cooperative communication in wireless networks
IEEE Communications Magazine
Pricing for enabling forwarding in self-configuring ad hoc networks
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
A simple Cooperative diversity method based on network path selection
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Grouping and partner selection in cooperative wireless networks
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Coalitions in Cooperative Wireless Networks
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
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In this paper, we investigate how to assign source-relay pairs to achieve cooperative diversity for multi-source and multi-relay wireless networks. The problem of interest is formulated as a matching problem which can be modeled by a two-sided one-to-one matching game, i.e., a branch of coalitional games. The deferred acceptance procedure is introduced to solve the matching problem, and it turns out that a solution can always be found and is proved in the core of the coalitional game. Consequently, each node is satisfied with its final state and has no incentive to deviate, which leads to a stable matching state. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed matching scheme has linear time complexity, which means the scheme is easy to implement. However, it can achieve comparable performance to that employing centralized optimal scheme in terms of total profit of the system.