Market power in a deregulated electrical industry
Decision Support Systems
A micro-economic approach to conflict resolution in mobile computing
ACM SIGSOFT Software Engineering Notes
Spot Market Mechanism Design and Competitively Issues in Electric Power
HICSS '98 Proceedings of the Thirty-First Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences - Volume 3
Electronic Trading on Electricity Markets within a Multi-agent Framework
ICCCI '09 Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Computational Collective Intelligence. Semantic Web, Social Networks and Multiagent Systems
Multi-Stage Pricing Game for Collusion-Resistant Dynamic Spectrum Allocation
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
A Market-Based Approach to Optimal Peak-Load Power Allocation
HICSS '13 Proceedings of the 2013 46th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences
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In this paper the authors propose a market-based mechanism for organizational units of Commercial and Industrial power consumers or companies in a consortium to reduce their peak power demand. The market mechanism requires participants' bids to indicate the value they associate with power needed to run various services, and the power quantity requirement for these services over a time horizon. The market resolution produces peak demand allocation, i.e., determination of the peak demand and the associated cost that the units need to pay. The global peak-demand is then derived by optimizing individual participants' peak demand. The market mechanism is based on decision optimization, and guarantees the formally defined properties of Pareto optimality, Nash equilibrium and benefit distribution fairness.