Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Anonymity, unobservability, and pseudeonymity — a proposal for terminology
International workshop on Designing privacy enhancing technologies: design issues in anonymity and unobservability
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
This work presents an attack on the privacy of some voting systems. We show that by combining information from several sources, some of it publicly available, and some of it can be easily collected ad-hoc, an adversary can greatly reduce the size of a voter's anonymity set. In many cases the obtained information is sufficient to deduce the content of a vote (or approximate a small set of possible values). As a test case, we present this attack in the context of the Israeli general parliamentary elections. Simulations we ran show that we can successfully determine the value of about 50% of the votes after observing three election systems.