Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Shining Light in Dark Places: Understanding the Tor Network
PETS '08 Proceedings of the 8th international symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
An improved algorithm for tor circuit scheduling
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Proceedings of the 27th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Anatomy of a large european IXP
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2012 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communication
Throttling Tor bandwidth parasites
Security'12 Proceedings of the 21st USENIX conference on Security symposium
Enhancing Tor's performance using real-time traffic classification
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Touching from a distance: website fingerprinting attacks and defenses
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Demystifying page load performance with WProf
nsdi'13 Proceedings of the 10th USENIX conference on Networked Systems Design and Implementation
Hi-index | 0.00 |
Tor is a widely used network for anonymous communication. Its users frequently experience large communication delays, due to the high user-to-relay ratio, the bandwidth-intensive BitTorrent transfers of a small fraction of the user base, and the inherent latencies from routing traffic through multiple relay hops scattered around the world. These delays significantly degrade the user experience of web browsing, a dominant use of Tor. Improving web browsing performance of Tor has been a subject of much research. Targeting the network and transport layers, prior work includes proposals to throttle bandwidth-intensive connections or to prioritize interactive traffic such as web browsing. We attack the problem at the application layer, noting that a typical web page consists of multiple resources, each of which requires a one-round-trip HTTP request-response cycle to load in the browser. Thus, for a page with many resources, these round trips are a major contributor to the page load time. We investigate PnP (for Prefetch-and-Push), where the Tor exit prefetches resources of the web page a client is visiting and pushes them to the client. Our experiments show a significant reduction in page load times as well as higher client's privacy from web page fingerprinting by a local attacker.