Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Towards an analysis of onion routing security
International workshop on Designing privacy enhancing technologies: design issues in anonymity and unobservability
On inferring autonomous system relationships in the internet
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Location diversity in anonymity networks
Proceedings of the 2004 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
The predecessor attack: An analysis of a threat to anonymous communications systems
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Low-Cost Traffic Analysis of Tor
SP '05 Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
All of Nonparametric Statistics (Springer Texts in Statistics)
All of Nonparametric Statistics (Springer Texts in Statistics)
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Denial of service or denial of security?
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Scalable Link-Based Relay Selection for Anonymous Routing
PETS '09 Proceedings of the 9th International Symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Proceedings of the 9th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement conference
As-awareness in Tor path selection
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
How much anonymity does network latency leak?
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Towards an information theoretic metric for anonymity
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Sampled traffic analysis by internet-exchange-level adversaries
PET'07 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
PET'07 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
A practical congestion attack on tor using long paths
SSYM'09 Proceedings of the 18th conference on USENIX security symposium
Towards an AS-to-organization map
IMC '10 Proceedings of the 10th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement
How unique is your web browser?
PETS'10 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
BridgeSPA: improving Tor bridges with single packet authorization
Proceedings of the 10th annual ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Trust-based anonymous communication: adversary models and routing algorithms
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
LASTor: A Low-Latency AS-Aware Tor Client
SP '12 Proceedings of the 2012 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Methodically modeling the Tor network
CSET'12 Proceedings of the 5th USENIX conference on Cyber Security Experimentation and Test
Changing of the guards: a framework for understanding and improving entry guard selection in tor
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Touching from a distance: website fingerprinting attacks and defenses
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Probabilistic analysis of onion routing in a black-box model
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
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We present the first analysis of the popular Tor anonymity network that indicates the security of typical users against reasonably realistic adversaries in the Tor network or in the underlying Internet. Our results show that Tor users are far more susceptible to compromise than indicated by prior work. Specific contributions of the paper include(1)a model of various typical kinds of users,(2)an adversary model that includes Tor network relays, autonomous systems(ASes), Internet exchange points (IXPs), and groups of IXPs drawn from empirical study,(3) metrics that indicate how secure users are over a period of time,(4) the most accurate topological model to date of ASes and IXPs as they relate to Tor usage and network configuration,(5) a novel realistic Tor path simulator (TorPS), and(6)analyses of security making use of all the above. To show that our approach is useful to explore alternatives and not just Tor as currently deployed, we also analyze a published alternative path selection algorithm, Congestion-Aware Tor. We create an empirical model of Tor congestion, identify novel attack vectors, and show that it too is more vulnerable than previously indicated.