Tappan Zee (north) bridge: mining memory accesses for introspection

  • Authors:
  • Brendan Dolan-Gavitt;Tim Leek;Josh Hodosh;Wenke Lee

  • Affiliations:
  • Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, Georgia, USA;MIT Lincoln Laboratory, Lexington, Massachusetts, USA;MIT Lincoln Laboratory, Lexington, Massachusetts, USA;Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, Georgia, USA

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security
  • Year:
  • 2013

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Abstract

The ability to introspect into the behavior of software at runtime is crucial for many security-related tasks, such as virtual machine-based intrusion detection and low-artifact malware analysis. Although some progress has been made in this task by automatically creating programs that can passively retrieve kernel-level information, two key challenges remain. First, it is currently difficult to extract useful information from user-level applications, such as web browsers. Second, discovering points within the OS and applications to hook for active monitoring is still an entirely manual process. In this paper we propose a set of techniques to mine the memory accesses made by an operating system and its applications to locate useful places to deploy active monitoring, which we call tap points. We demonstrate the efficacy of our techniques by finding tap points for useful introspection tasks such as finding SSL keys and monitoring web browser activity on five different operating systems (Windows 7, Linux, FreeBSD, Minix and Haiku) and two processor architectures (ARM and x86).