Revisiting the uniqueness of simple demographics in the US population
Proceedings of the 5th ACM workshop on Privacy in electronic society
On the leakage of personally identifiable information via online social networks
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM workshop on Online social networks
Don't kill my ads!: balancing privacy in an ad-supported mobile application market
Proceedings of the Twelfth Workshop on Mobile Computing Systems & Applications
Unsafe exposure analysis of mobile in-app advertisements
Proceedings of the fifth ACM conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks
AdSplit: separating smartphone advertising from applications
Security'12 Proceedings of the 21st USENIX conference on Security symposium
TRUST'12 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Trust and Trustworthy Computing
AdDroid: privilege separation for applications and advertisers in Android
Proceedings of the 7th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security
Proceedings of the third ACM conference on Data and application security and privacy
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A growing concern with advertisement libraries on Android is their ability to exfiltrate personal information from their host applications. While previous work has looked at the libraries' abilities to extract private information from the system, advertising libraries also include APIs through which a host application can deliberately leak private information about the user. This study, considering a corpus of 114,000 apps, is the first to focus on those APIs. We reconstruct the APIs for 103 ad libraries used in the corpus, and study how the privacy leaking APIs from the top 20 ad libraries are used by the 64,000 applications in which they are included. Notably, we have found that app popularity correlates with privacy leakage; the marginal increase in advertising revenue, multiplied over a larger user base, seems to incentivize these app vendors to violate their users' privacy.