STOC '87 Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Completeness theorems for non-cryptographic fault-tolerant distributed computation
STOC '88 Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Adaptive Security for Threshold Cryptosystems
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Proofs of Partial Knowledge and Simplified Design of Witness Hiding Protocols
CRYPTO '94 Proceedings of the 14th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
PKC '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
Efficient threshold cryptosystems
Efficient threshold cryptosystems
FairplayMP: a system for secure multi-party computation
Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Fully homomorphic encryption using ideal lattices
Proceedings of the forty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Native Client: a sandbox for portable, untrusted x86 native code
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Secure Multi-party Computation Minimizing Online Rounds
ASIACRYPT '09 Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
i-hop homomorphic encryption and rerandomizable Yao circuits
CRYPTO'10 Proceedings of the 30th annual conference on Advances in cryptology
Adapting software fault isolation to contemporary CPU architectures
USENIX Security'10 Proceedings of the 19th USENIX conference on Security
Efficient Secure Two-Party Protocols: Techniques and Constructions
Efficient Secure Two-Party Protocols: Techniques and Constructions
Secure two-party computation via cut-and-choose oblivious transfer
TCC'11 Proceedings of the 8th conference on Theory of cryptography
Language-independent sandboxing of just-in-time compilation and self-modifying code
Proceedings of the 32nd ACM SIGPLAN conference on Programming language design and implementation
Efficient non-interactive secure computation
EUROCRYPT'11 Proceedings of the 30th Annual international conference on Theory and applications of cryptographic techniques: advances in cryptology
Secure computation on the web: computing without simultaneous interaction
CRYPTO'11 Proceedings of the 31st annual conference on Advances in cryptology
The security impact of a new cryptographic library
LATINCRYPT'12 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Cryptology and Information Security in Latin America
An architecture for practical actively secure MPC with dishonest majority
Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security
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This work intends to bring secure multi-party computation to the masses by designing and implementing a browser-based system that enables non-interactive secure computation. The system, denoted Canon-MPC for "CAsual NON-interactive secure Multi-Party Computation", is casual in the sense that participants do not need to install any software and do not need to agree on a time in which they all have to be online in order to run the computation. Rather, each participant can use a web browser to participate in the secure computation. The protocol is executed in a single pass between the participants. Each participant connects to a server once, without requiring other participants to be connected to the server at the same time. The system is appropriate for use by laypersons, since there is no need to install or configure any software except for a web browser. The system is based on a protocol of Halevi et al. (Crypto 2011) for secure computation of symmetric binary functions, that is secure against malicious adversaries. We optimized the protocol using a batching technique for zero-knowledge proofs that greatly reduces their overhead. We implemented a web site and client software for running the protocol, where the client was implemented using Native Client technology for running native code in a sandbox from within a web browser. We demonstrate that this technology is ideal for cryptographic applications. We describe experiments measuring the performance of the system. Lastly, we describe a variant of the protocol that can handle absentee parties, who were invited to participate in the protocol but did not show up.