Location Privacy in Pervasive Computing
IEEE Pervasive Computing
Mix Zones: User Privacy in Location-aware Services
PERCOMW '04 Proceedings of the Second IEEE Annual Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications Workshops
Location Privacy in Mobile Systems: A Personalized Anonymization Model
ICDCS '05 Proceedings of the 25th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
Protecting Location Privacy Through Path Confusion
SECURECOMM '05 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Security and Privacy for Emerging Areas in Communications Networks
Enhancing Security and Privacy in Traffic-Monitoring Systems
IEEE Pervasive Computing
Anonymous Usage of Location-Based Services Through Spatial and Temporal Cloaking
Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Mobile systems, applications and services
Protecting Moving Trajectories with Dummies
MDM '07 Proceedings of the 2007 International Conference on Mobile Data Management
On the Anonymity of Home/Work Location Pairs
Pervasive '09 Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Pervasive Computing
Hiding stars with fireworks: location privacy through camouflage
Proceedings of the 15th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
On the Optimal Placement of Mix Zones
PETS '09 Proceedings of the 9th International Symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
PAD: privacy-area aware, dummy-based location privacy in mobile services
Proceedings of the Seventh ACM International Workshop on Data Engineering for Wireless and Mobile Access
Inference attacks on location tracks
PERVASIVE'07 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Pervasive computing
Unraveling an old cloak: k-anonymity for location privacy
Proceedings of the 9th annual ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Achieving efficient query privacy for location based services
PETS'10 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
SP '11 Proceedings of the 2011 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Quantifying location privacy: the case of sporadic location exposure
PETS'11 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Evaluating the privacy risk of location-based services
FC'11 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Protecting location privacy: optimal strategy against localization attacks
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
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Various Location Privacy-Preserving Mechanisms (LPPMs) have been proposed in the literature to address the privacy risks derived from the exposure of user locations through the use of Location Based Services (LBSs). LPPMs obfuscate the locations disclosed to the LBS provider using a variety of strategies, which come at a cost either in terms of quality of service, or of resource consumption, or both. Shokri et al. propose an LPPM design framework that outputs optimal LPPM parameters considering a strategic adversary that knows the algorithm implemented by the LPPM, and has prior knowledge on the users' mobility profiles [23]. The framework allows users to set a constraint on the tolerable loss quality of service due to perturbations in the locations exposed by the LPPM. We observe that this constraint does not capture the fact that some LPPMs rely on techniques that augment the level of privacy by increasing resource consumption. In this work we extend Shokri et al.'s framework to account for constraints on bandwidth consumption. This allows us to evaluate and compare LPPMs that generate dummies queries or that decrease the precision of the disclosed locations. We study the trilateral trade-off between privacy, quality of service, and bandwidth, using real mobility data. Our results show that dummy-based LPPMs offer the best protection for a given combination of quality and bandwidth constraints, and that, as soon as communication overhead is permitted, both dummy-based and precision-based LPPMs outperform LPPMs that only perturb the exposed locations. We also observe that the maximum value of privacy a user can enjoy can be reached by either sufficiently relaxing the quality loss or the bandwidth constraints, or by choosing an adequate combination of both constraints. Our results contribute to a better understanding of the effectiveness of location privacy protection strategies, and to the design of LPPMs with constrained resource consumption.