Protecting data privacy in private information retrieval schemes
STOC '98 Proceedings of the thirtieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Founding Cryptography on Oblivious Transfer --- Efficiently
CRYPTO 2008 Proceedings of the 28th Annual conference on Cryptology: Advances in Cryptology
Public-key cryptosystems based on composite degree residuosity classes
EUROCRYPT'99 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
A fully homomorphic encryption scheme
A fully homomorphic encryption scheme
Efficient techniques for privacy-preserving sharing of sensitive information
TRUST'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Trust and trustworthy computing
(Leveled) fully homomorphic encryption without bootstrapping
Proceedings of the 3rd Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference
Privacy-preserving set operations
CRYPTO'05 Proceedings of the 25th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
A simple BGN-Type cryptosystem from LWE
EUROCRYPT'10 Proceedings of the 29th Annual international conference on Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Fully homomorphic encryption with polylog overhead
EUROCRYPT'12 Proceedings of the 31st Annual international conference on Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Usable, Secure, Private Search
IEEE Security and Privacy
Secure pattern matching using somewhat homomorphic encryption
Proceedings of the 2013 ACM workshop on Cloud computing security workshop
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In a private database query system, a client issues queries to a database and obtains the results without learning anything else about the database and without the server learning the query. While previous work has yielded systems that can efficiently support disjunction queries, performing conjunction queries privately remains an open problem. In this work, we show that using a polynomial encoding of the database enables efficient implementations of conjunction queries using somewhat homomorphic encryption. We describe a three-party protocol that supports efficient evaluation of conjunction queries. Then, we present two implementations of our protocol using Paillier's additively homomorphic system as well as Brakerski's somewhat homomorphic cryptosystem. Finally, we show that the additional homomorphic properties of the Brakerski cryptosystem allow us to handle queries involving several thousand elements over a million-record database in just a few minutes, far outperforming the implementation using the additively homomorphic system.