Wireless sensor network localization techniques
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
A security risk analysis of the data communications network proposed in the nextgen air traffic control system
Short paper: reactive jamming in wireless networks: how realistic is the threat?
Proceedings of the fourth ACM conference on Wireless network security
Investigation of signal and message manipulations on the wireless channel
ESORICS'11 Proceedings of the 16th European conference on Research in computer security
On the security of public key protocols
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
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This work studies the security of next generation air traffic surveillance technology based on Automatic Dependent Surveillance --- Broadcast (ADS-B). ADS-B is already supported by a majority of international aircraft and will become mandatory in 2020 for most airspaces worldwide. While it is known that ADS-B might be susceptible to different spoofing attacks, the complexity and impact of launching these attacks has been debated controversially by the air traffic control community. Yet, the literature remains unclear on the requirements of launching ADS-B attacks in real-world environments, and on the constraints which affect their feasibility. In this paper, we take a scientific approach to systematically evaluate realistic ADS-B attacks. Our objective is to shed light on the practicability of different threats and to quantify the main factors that impact the success of such attacks. Our results reveal some bad news: attacks on ADS-B can be inexpensive and highly successful. Using a controlled experimental design, we offer insights from a real-world feasibility analysis that leads to the conclusion that any safety-critical air traffic decision process should not rely exclusively on the ADS-B system.