Impact analysis of JellyFish attack on TCP-based mobile ad-hoc networks

Authors:
Vijay Laxmi;Deepanshu Mehta;M. S. Gaur;Parvez Faruki;Chhagan lal
Affiliations:
Malaviya National Institute of Technology, Jaipur, India;Malaviya National Institute of Technology, Jaipur, India;Malaviya National Institute of Technology, Jaipur, India;Malaviya National Institute of Technology, Jaipur, India;Malaviya National Institute of Technology, Jaipur, India
Venue:
Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Security of Information and Networks
Year:
2013

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Abstract

Tremendous increase has been seen in the number of application areas of mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs) in recent years owing to the advancements in hardware of hand- held devices and wireless network deployment technologies. As a result, providing security in these kinds of networks has become central concern for researchers. In this paper, we analyze the behavior and impacts of JellyFish attack over TCP-based MANETs. We implement and evaluate three variants of JellyFish attack namely JF-reorder, JF-delay and JF-drop. JellyFish attack exploits the behavior of closed loop protocols such as TCP and performs the attacks without disobeying any rules of the protocol. Consequently, it causes ruinous effects and becomes difficult to detect due to its protocol compliance nature. This paper provides the complete simulation study of JellyFish attacks on three TCP variants known as TCP-Tahoe, TCP-SACK and TCP-NewReno. The simulations have been taken in the light of throughput, number of JF nodes and number of retransmissions. The paper contributes to the field of denial of service (DoS) attacks in MANETs by giving a comparative analysis of three TCP variants and discovers which TCP variant performs best under different variants of JellyFish attack. In addition to this, our simulation results also shed some light on the seriousness of the attacks caused by JF nodes and their effects on data communication.