Preventing malicious data harvesting from deallocated memory areas

Authors:
Maxim Anikeev;Felix Freiling
Affiliations:
Southern Federal University, Taganrog, Russia;Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Erlangen, Germany
Venue:
Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Security of Information and Networks
Year:
2013

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Abstract

The possibility of unauthorized data exposure caused by memory deallocation flaws in various software products has been accentuated by some IT-security experts several years ago [1, 2, 3, 4]. However, no feasible and universal strategies have been proposed so far to reduce that risk. In this paper we discuss possible approaches to reducing the chances of undesirable exposure of sensible information caused by unreasonably long data lifetime in main memory. We offer several directions of how current development platforms and runtime environments could be improved to minimize the lifetime of confidential data on the software design stage.