Linear cryptanalysis method for DES cipher
EUROCRYPT '93 Workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
The Design of Rijndael
Differential Cryptanalysis of DES-like Cryptosystems
CRYPTO '90 Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Cryptanalysis of Block Ciphers with Overdefined Systems of Equations
ASIACRYPT '02 Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
A New Class of Invertible Mappings
CHES '02 Revised Papers from the 4th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Security as a new dimension in embedded system design
Proceedings of the 41st annual Design Automation Conference
Security in embedded systems: Design challenges
ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems (TECS)
Introduction to Modern Cryptography (Chapman & Hall/Crc Cryptography and Network Security Series)
Introduction to Modern Cryptography (Chapman & Hall/Crc Cryptography and Network Security Series)
Aiding side-channel attacks on cryptographic software with satisfiability-based analysis
IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems
A Survey of Lightweight-Cryptography Implementations
IEEE Design & Test
PRESENT: An Ultra-Lightweight Block Cipher
CHES '07 Proceedings of the 9th international workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Algebraic and Slide Attacks on KeeLoq
Fast Software Encryption
A Meet-in-the-Middle Attack on 8-Round AES
Fast Software Encryption
Cryptanalysis of EC-RAC, a RFID Identification Protocol
CANS '08 Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Cryptology and Network Security
Low-cost untraceable authentication protocols for RFID
Proceedings of the third ACM conference on Wireless network security
Higher order correlation attacks, XL algorithm and cryptanalysis of Toyocrypt
ICISC'02 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Information security and cryptology
ASIACRYPT'07 Proceedings of the Advances in Crypotology 13th international conference on Theory and application of cryptology and information security
PRINTcipher: a block cipher for IC-printing
CHES'10 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
On the claimed privacy of EC-RAC III
RFIDSec'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Radio frequency identification: security and privacy issues
EC-RAC: enriching a capacious RFID attack collection
RFIDSec'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Radio frequency identification: security and privacy issues
The PHOTON family of lightweight Hash functions
CRYPTO'11 Proceedings of the 31st annual conference on Advances in cryptology
RFID security and privacy: a research survey
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Towards green cryptography: a comparison of lightweight ciphers from the energy viewpoint
CHES'12 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Low-latency encryption: is "Lightweight = light + wait"?
CHES'12 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
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In [12], the authors present a new light-weight cryptographic primitive which supports an associated RFID-based authentication protocol. The primitive has some structural similarities to AES, but is presented as a keyed one-way function using a 128-bit key. Although a security analysis is included, this is at a high-level only. To provide a more concrete idea as to the security of this primitive, we therefore make three contributions: first, a structural attack requiring O(25) plaintext/ciphertext pairs (and hence effort online) plus O(221) effort offline, second algebraic attacks on round reduced versions of the primitive which requires only a single plaintext/ciphertext pair, and, third debunk the claimed attack of [36] on the same primitive. Our structural attack completely breaks the primitive and the algebraic attack highlights a crucial weakness of the primitive; we conclude that although one can consider countermeasures against these specific attacks, the design in general is questionable and should therefore be avoided.