Random oracles are practical: a paradigm for designing efficient protocols
CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
The random oracle methodology, revisited (preliminary version)
STOC '98 Proceedings of the thirtieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Separating Random Oracle Proofs from Complexity Theoretic Proofs: The Non-committing Encryption Case
CRYPTO '02 Proceedings of the 22nd Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
ACSAC '96 Proceedings of the 12th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
On the (In)security of the Fiat-Shamir Paradigm
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
FlyByNight: mitigating the privacy risks of social networking
Proceedings of the 7th ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Type-Based Proxy Re-encryption and Its Construction
INDOCRYPT '08 Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Cryptology in India: Progress in Cryptology
Usable secure mailing lists with untrusted servers
Proceedings of the 8th Symposium on Identity and Trust on the Internet
Conditional proxy re-encryption secure against chosen-ciphertext attack
Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on Information, Computer, and Communications Security
Efficient Conditional Proxy Re-encryption with Chosen-Ciphertext Security
ISC '09 Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Information Security
Anonymous Conditional Proxy Re-encryption without Random Oracle
ProvSec '09 Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Provable Security
Attribute based data sharing with attribute revocation
ASIACCS '10 Proceedings of the 5th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security
Unidirectional chosen-ciphertext secure proxy re-encryption
PKC'08 Proceedings of the Practice and theory in public key cryptography, 11th international conference on Public key cryptography
Hierarchical attribute-based encryption for fine-grained access control in cloud storage services
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
CCA-Secure Type-based Proxy Re-encryption with Invisible Proxy
CIT '10 Proceedings of the 2010 10th IEEE International Conference on Computer and Information Technology
A secure and mutual-profitable DRM interoperability scheme
ISCC '10 Proceedings of the The IEEE symposium on Computers and Communications
EASiER: encryption-based access control in social networks with efficient revocation
Proceedings of the 6th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security
On the generic insecurity of the full domain hash
CRYPTO'05 Proceedings of the 25th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
Practical identity-based encryption without random oracles
EUROCRYPT'06 Proceedings of the 24th annual international conference on The Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Unidirectional Chosen-Ciphertext Secure Proxy Re-Encryption
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
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In a proxy re-encryption (PRE) scheme, a delegator gives a re-encryption key to a semi-trusted proxy who, by using the re-encryption key, can transform a ciphertext encrypted under the delegator's public key into one that can be decrypted using a private key of another user (called a delegatee). To provide fine-grained delegation, type-based PRE (TB-PRE) was introduced in which the decryption right can be selectively delegated. The proxy in TB-PRE can only re-encrypt ciphertexts with a specific type selected by the delegator. Tang proposed the first proxy-invisible TB-PRE scheme where proxy invisibility means that an adversary cannot distinguish between original ciphertexts and re-encrypted ciphertexts. However, Tang's scheme is only secure against chosen-plaintext attacks. Jia et al. proposed a proxy-invisible TB-PRE scheme that is secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks with random oracle heuristic. To date, there is no TB-PRE scheme achieving both proxy invisibility and chosen-ciphertext security in the standard model (i.e., without random oracles). We propose the first proxy-invisible TB-PRE scheme that is secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks in the standard model.