SAFE: a strategy-proof auction mechanism for multi-radio, multi-channel spectrum allocation

Authors:
Ruihao Zhu;Fan Wu;Guihai Chen
Affiliations:
Shanghai Key Laboratory of Scalable Computing and Systems, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, China;Shanghai Key Laboratory of Scalable Computing and Systems, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, China;Shanghai Key Laboratory of Scalable Computing and Systems, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, China
Venue:
WASA'13 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Wireless Algorithms, Systems, and Applications
Year:
2013

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Abstract

The rapid growth of wireless technology has led to increasing demand for spectrum. In the past, spectrum is statically allocated. As a result, many wireless applications cannot use idle spectrum even though it is left unused by the owner for a long period of time. The low utilization of already scarce spectrum resource requires us to dynamically reallocate the idle spectrum to achieve better spectrum usage. In this paper, we model the problem of spectrum reallocation as a sealed-bid reserve auction, and propose SAFE, which is a S trategy-proof A uction mechanism F or multi-radio, multi-channel spE ctrum allocation. We prove the strategy-proofness of SAFE theoretically, and evaluate its performance extensively. Evaluation results show that SAFE achieve good performance, in terms of spectrum utilization and buyer satisfaction ratio.