Investment and Pricing with Spectrum Uncertainty: A Cognitive Operator's Perspective
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
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This paper considers the problem that the virtual mobile operator (VMO) buys services from the wireless service provider (WSP) to serve its users. When faced with poor indoor coverage or at the edge of marcocell, the WSP would ask nearby femto base stations (FBSs) to help serve the VMO. We focus on the interesting questions when the WSP prefers to ask help from FBSs and how WSP, VMO and FBSs adjust their strategies to maximize their profits. A two-stage Stackelberg game is built for the situation when the WSP serve the VMO by itself and a four-stage Stackelberg game is considered when the WSP rents FBSs by offering spectrum bands to FBSs. We firstly define the utility functions of VMO, WSP and FBSs to reflect their satisfaction and cost in participating into the game and then give the analysis based on the backward induction method. Meanwhile, the competition among FBSs when the WSP allocates spectrum bands for FBSs' help is formulated as a non-cooperative spectrum competition game (NSCG) and the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in NSCG is proved. Simulation results of the two service modes show the WSP can obtain more profits through renting FBSs in poor coverage areas.