EUROCRYPT '93 Workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
IPSec: The New Security Standard for the Internet, Intranets, and Virtual Private Networks
IPSec: The New Security Standard for the Internet, Intranets, and Virtual Private Networks
SeRLoc: Robust localization for wireless sensor networks
ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks (TOSN)
An RFID Distance Bounding Protocol
SECURECOMM '05 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Security and Privacy for Emerging Areas in Communications Networks
ROPE: robust position estimation in wireless sensor networks
IPSN '05 Proceedings of the 4th international symposium on Information processing in sensor networks
Location privacy of distance bounding protocols
Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
WiMAX femtocell: requirements, challenges, and solutions
IEEE Communications Magazine
Building femtocell more secure with improved proxy signature
GLOBECOM'09 Proceedings of the 28th IEEE conference on Global telecommunications
ID-based secure distance bounding and localization
ESORICS'09 Proceedings of the 14th European conference on Research in computer security
Security analysis of a femtocell device
Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Security of information and networks
Secure positioning in wireless networks
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Experimental analysis of the femtocell location verification techniques
NordSec'10 Proceedings of the 15th Nordic conference on Information Security Technology for Applications
| Hi-index | 12.05 |
Recently, femtocell solutions have been attracting increasing attention since coverage for broadband radios can effectively eliminate wireless notspots. To restrict malicious subscribers from accessing femtocells, 3G/WiMAX standards introduce an access control strategy, called Closed Subscriber Group (CSG). However, CSG only prevents malicious clients, but not rouge femtocells. In 2009, Han et al. proposed the first mutual authentication mechanism. This mechanism does not consider the case that an attacker can locate femtocells in an unregistered area even these femtocells are legitimate. In this paper, we first define two attacks, sinkhole and wormhole attacks, in femtocell-enabled mobile networks. Then, we design two approaches based on distance bounding protocols and geographic information to defend against these two attacks. In our design, a subscriber can confirm whether or not the femtocell he connected with is physically-present. Experiment results demonstrate that the distance bounding protocol can estimate an approximate distance between a subscriber's device and the deployed femtocell. Moreover, femtocells that are deployed inside or outside can both be identified and distinguished without the bias of signal strength based on our design.