A new polynomial-time algorithm for linear programming
STOC '84 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Computing the optimal strategy to commit to
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Statistical debugging: simultaneous identification of multiple bugs
ICML '06 Proceedings of the 23rd international conference on Machine learning
CSF '08 Proceedings of the 2008 21st IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Computing optimal randomized resource allocations for massive security games
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
ARMOR security for Los Angeles international airport
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 3
Fingerprinting the datacenter: automated classification of performance crises
Proceedings of the 5th European conference on Computer systems
Policy auditing over incomplete logs: theory, implementation and applications
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Security and Game Theory: Algorithms, Deployed Systems, Lessons Learned
Security and Game Theory: Algorithms, Deployed Systems, Lessons Learned
Approximation algorithm for security games with costly resources
WINE'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Security games with multiple attacker resources
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
GUARDS: innovative application of game theory for national airport security
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume Three
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Effective enforcement of laws and policies requires expending resources to prevent and detect offenders, as well as appropriate punishment schemes to deter violators. In particular, enforcement of privacy laws and policies in modern organizations that hold large volumes of personal information (e.g., hospitals, banks) relies heavily on internal audit mechanisms. We study economic considerations in the design of these mechanisms, focusing in particular on effective resource allocation and appropriate punishment schemes. We present an audit game model that is a natural generalization of a standard security game model for resource allocation with an additional punishment parameter. Computing the Stackelberg equilibrium for this game is challenging because it involves solving an optimization problem with non-convex quadratic constraints. We present an additive FPTAS that efficiently computes the solution.