Partner tiering in display advertising

  • Authors:
  • Anand Bhalgat;Nitish Korula;Hannadiy Leontyev;Max Lin;Vahab Mirrokni

  • Affiliations:
  • Facebook Inc, Menlo Park, CA, USA;Google Research, New York City, NY, USA;Google Inc, New York City, NY, USA;Google Inc, New York City, NY, USA;Google Research, New York, NY, USA

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 7th ACM international conference on Web search and data mining
  • Year:
  • 2014

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Abstract

Display ads on the Internet are often sold by publishers to advertisers in bundles of thousands or millions of impressions over a particular time period. The ad delivery systems assign ads to pages on behalf of publishers to satisfy these contracts, and at the same time, try to maximize the overall quality of assignment. This is usually modeled in the literature as an online allocation problem, where contracts are represented by overall delivery constraints. However an important aspect of these contracts is missed by the classical formulation: a majority of these contracts are not between advertisers and publishers; a set of publishers is typically represented by a middle-man and advertisers buy inventory from the middle man. As publishers vary in quality and importance, advertisers prefer these publishers differently. Similarly, as the inventory of ads is limited, ad-delivery engine needs to prefer a high-quality publisher over a low quality publisher for supplying ads. We formulate this problem as a hierarchical online matching problem where each incoming impression has a level indicating its importance, and study its theoretical properties. We also design practical solutions to this problem and study their performance on real data sets.