Malicious Code on Java Card Smartcards: Attacks and Countermeasures
CARDIS '08 Proceedings of the 8th IFIP WG 8.8/11.2 international conference on Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications
Developing a Trojan applets in a smart card
Journal in Computer Virology
Java type confusion and fault attacks
FDTC'06 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography
Combined attacks and countermeasures
CARDIS'10 Proceedings of the 9th IFIP WG 8.8/11.2 international conference on Smart Card Research and Advanced Application
Attacks on java card 3.0 combining fault and logical attacks
CARDIS'10 Proceedings of the 9th IFIP WG 8.8/11.2 international conference on Smart Card Research and Advanced Application
Cryptography and Security
Combined software and hardware attacks on the java card control flow
CARDIS'11 Proceedings of the 10th IFIP WG 8.8/11.2 international conference on Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications
Java card operand stack: fault attacks, combined attacks and countermeasures
CARDIS'11 Proceedings of the 10th IFIP WG 8.8/11.2 international conference on Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications
Towards the hardware accelerated defensive virtual machine: type and bound protection
CARDIS'12 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications
Detecting Attacks on Java Cards by Fingerprinting Applets
WETICE '13 Proceedings of the 2013 Workshops on Enabling Technologies: Infrastructure for Collaborative Enterprises
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Java enabled smart cards protect security-related code and data by a sandbox concept. Unfortunately, this sandbox can be bypassed by fault attacks. Therefore, there is a substantial need for transparent, effective, and low-overhead countermeasures. This work demonstrates a new countermeasure against type confusion and buffer overflow attacks. This new countermeasure is based on obfuscating the security critical calculation parts of a virtual machine by secret keys. This countermeasure was integrated into a Java Card virtual machine running on a smart card prototype. New hardware features were added to this prototype to accelerate the obfuscating operation. The execution time overhead of the new countermeasure is demonstrated by performing run-time measurements on the prototype.