Multi-module vulnerability analysis of web-based applications
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
CLAMP: Practical Prevention of Large-Scale Data Leaks
SP '09 Proceedings of the 2009 30th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Swaddler: an approach for the anomaly-based detection of state violations in web applications
RAID'07 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Recent advances in intrusion detection
Nemesis: preventing authentication & access control vulnerabilities in web applications
SSYM'09 Proceedings of the 18th conference on USENIX security symposium
NoTamper: automatic blackbox detection of parameter tampering opportunities in web applications
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Why Johnny can't pentest: an analysis of black-box web vulnerability scanners
DIMVA'10 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Detection of intrusions and malware, and vulnerability assessment
Toward automated detection of logic vulnerabilities in web applications
USENIX Security'10 Proceedings of the 19th USENIX conference on Security
Static detection of access control vulnerabilities in web applications
SEC'11 Proceedings of the 20th USENIX conference on Security
Fear the EAR: discovering and mitigating execution after redirect vulnerabilities
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Automated black-box detection of side-channel vulnerabilities in web applications
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
WAPTEC: whitebox analysis of web applications for parameter tampering exploit construction
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
RoleCast: finding missing security checks when you do not know what checks are
Proceedings of the 2011 ACM international conference on Object oriented programming systems languages and applications
BLOCK: a black-box approach for detection of state violation attacks towards web applications
Proceedings of the 27th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
SENTINEL: securing database from logic flaws in web applications
Proceedings of the second ACM conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy
Enemy of the state: a state-aware black-box web vulnerability scanner
Security'12 Proceedings of the 21st USENIX conference on Security symposium
EARs in the wild: large-scale analysis of execution after redirect vulnerabilities
Proceedings of the 28th Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Computing
LogicScope: automatic discovery of logic vulnerabilities within web applications
Proceedings of the 8th ACM SIGSAC symposium on Information, computer and communications security
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Access control vulnerabilities within web applications pose serious security threats to the sensitive information stored at back-end databases. Existing approaches are limited from several aspects, including the coarse granularity at which the access control is modeled, the incapability of handling complex relationship between data entities and the requirement of source code and the specific application platform. In this paper, we present an automated black-box technique for identifying a broad range of access control vulnerabilities, which can be applied to applications that are developed using different languages and platforms. We model the access control policy based on a novel virtual SQL query concept, which captures both the database access operations (i.e., through SQL queries) and the post-processing filters within the web application. We leverage a crawler to automatically explore the application and collect execution traces. From the traces, we identify the set of database access operations that are allowed for each role (i.e., role-level policy inference) and extract the constraints over the operation parameters to characterize the relationship between the users and the accessed data (i.e., user-level policy inference). Based on the inferred policy, we construct test inputs to exploit the application for potential access control flaws. We implement a prototype system BATMAN and evaluate it over a set of PHP and JSP web applications. The experiment results demonstrate the effectiveness and accuracy of our approach.