A cloud architecture for protecting guest's information from malicious operators with memory management

Authors:
Koki Murakami;Tsuyoshi Yamada;Rie Shigetomi Yamaguchi;Masahiro Goshima;Shuichi Sakai
Affiliations:
The University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan;The University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan;The University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan;The University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan;The University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan
Venue:
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Data and application security and privacy
Year:
2014

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Abstract

We introduce a novel cloud computing architecture that ensures privacy for guest's information and computation. In conventional cloud architecture, a security policy proposed by a provider only ensured the protection of guest's information. This enabled malicious operators to steal or modify guest's information. Our architecture protects guest's information with novel memory management function of hypervisor from malicious operators. Cloud computing generally relies on virtualization, and VMM or hypervisor maintains page table for interfering VM's memory accesses, which is called shadow page table. Our hypervisor regulates memory accesses by management VM by adding a authority bit to shadow page table entry. Our architecture also prohibits a theft of guest's information when it is stored in storage by encrypting data when they leave memory.