Cooperative assignment games with the inverse Monge property

Authors:
F. Javier Martínez-De-Albéniz;Carles Rafels
Affiliations:
-;-
Venue:
Discrete Applied Mathematics
Year:
2014

Citing 2
Cited 0

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SFCS '92 Proceedings of the 33rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science

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Abstract

We study inverse-Monge assignment games, namely cooperative assignment games in which the assignment matrix satisfies the inverse-Monge property. For square inverse-Monge assignment games, we describe their cores and we obtain a closed formula for the buyers-optimal and the sellers-optimal core allocations. We also apply the above results to solve the non-square case.