Monotonicity of single-seat preferential election rules
Discrete Applied Mathematics
Stochastic dominance-based rough set model for ordinal classification
Information Sciences: an International Journal
Environmental Modelling & Software
Loss optimal monotone relabeling of noisy multi-criteria data sets
Information Sciences: an International Journal
Supervised ranking in the weka environment
Information Sciences: an International Journal
Information Sciences: an International Journal
Aggregation of monotone reciprocal relations with application to group decision making
Fuzzy Sets and Systems
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We formulate a new ranking procedure in the traditional context where each voter has expressed a linear order relation or ranking over the candidates. The final ranking of the candidates is taken to be the one which best adheres to a natural monotonicity constraint. For a ranking a@?b@?c, monotonicity implies that the strength with which a@?c is supported should not be less than the strength with which either one of a@?b or b@?c is supported. We investigate some properties of this ranking procedure and encounter some surprising preliminary results.