Trojan Side-Channels: Lightweight Hardware Trojans through Side-Channel Engineering
CHES '09 Proceedings of the 11th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Proof-Carrying Hardware: Towards Runtime Verification of Reconfigurable Modules
RECONFIG '09 Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Reconfigurable Computing and FPGAs
Coquet: a coq library for verifying hardware
CPP'11 Proceedings of the First international conference on Certified Programs and Proofs
Proof-Carrying Hardware Intellectual Property: A Pathway to Trusted Module Acquisition
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security - Part 1
Exposing vulnerabilities of untrusted computing platforms
ICCD '12 Proceedings of the 2012 IEEE 30th International Conference on Computer Design (ICCD 2012)
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
We introduce a proof-carrying based framework for assessing the trustworthiness of third-party hardware Intellectual Property (IP), particularly geared toward microprocessor cores. This framework enables definition of and formal reasoning on security properties, which, in turn, are used to certify the genuineness and trustworthiness of the instruction set and, by extension, are used to prevent insertion of malicious functionality in the Hardware Description Language (HDL) code of an acquired microprocessor core. Security properties and trustworthiness proofs are derived based on a new formal hardware description language (formal-HDL), which is developed as part of the framework along with conversion rules to/from other HDLs to enable general applicability to IP cores independent of coding language. The proposed framework, along with the ability of a sample set of pertinent security properties to detect malicious IP modifications, is demonstrated on an 8051 microprocessor core.