Mitigating attacks on open functionality in SMS-capable cellular networks
Proceedings of the 12th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
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Review: A review of DoS attack models for 3G cellular networks from a system-design perspective
Computer Communications
A close examination of performance and power characteristics of 4G LTE networks
Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Mobile systems, applications, and services
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Proceedings of the 18th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Signaling oriented denial of service on LTE networks
Proceedings of the 10th ACM international symposium on Mobility management and wireless access
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Proceedings of the 14th Workshop on Mobile Computing Systems and Applications
An in-depth study of LTE: effect of network protocol and application behavior on performance
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2013 conference on SIGCOMM
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While it is often convenient for mobile cellular devices to have a public IP address, we show that such devices are vulnerable to stealthy malicious attacks. In particular, we show with experiments on three 4G/LTE cellular data networks in Singapore that it is easy for an attacker to initiate three different types of attacks on such mobile devices: (i) data quota drain, (ii) DoS flooding, and (iii) battery drain. Our experiments show that a potential attacker can completely exhaust the monthly data quota within a few minutes, completely choke the data connection of a mobile subscriber with a data stream of just 3 Mb/s, and increase the battery drain rate by up to 24 times. Finally, we argue that a simple proxy-based firewall with a secret IP address would be an effective and feasible defense against such potential attacks.