Risk management for multi-agent resource allocation under incomplete information

Authors:
Habiba Belleili-Souici;Ali-Abdelatif Betouil
Affiliations:
LabGed Laboratory, Department of Computer Sciences, Badji Mokhtar University, P.O. Box 12, Annaba, Algeria;LabGed Laboratory, Department of Computer Sciences, Badji Mokhtar University, P.O. Box 12, Annaba, Algeria
Venue:
International Journal of Systems, Control and Communications
Year:
2013

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Abstract

This paper tackles a distributed resource allocation among selfish agents for the redistribution of indivisible resources without side payment. Particularly, agents do not share their preferences and have to reach an allocation with good quality measured in term of social welfare. We use as quality indicator the Nash product which is an important welfare criterion that combines efficiency and fairness. We propose agents' mechanisms that embody risk management and acceptability criteria of deals together with an implicit concession to bring agents to an agreement.