Analysis of the increase and decrease algorithms for congestion avoidance in computer networks
Computer Networks and ISDN Systems
Paris metro pricing for the internet
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Fair end-to-end window-based congestion control
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Net neutrality: the technical side of the debate: a white paper
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
Pricing Communication Networks: Economics, Technology and Modelling (Wiley Interscience Series in Systems and Optimization)
Can ISPs be profitable without violating “network neutrality”?
Proceedings of the 3rd international workshop on Economics of networked systems
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2010 conference
Application neutrality and a paradox of side payments
Proceedings of the Re-Architecting the Internet Workshop
Internet economics: the use of Shapley value for ISP settlement
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
On cooperative settlement between content, transit, and eyeball internet service providers
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Workshop on internet economics (WIE2011) report
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Network neutrality and the role of regulation on the Internet have been heavily debated in recent times. Among the various definitions of network neutrality, we focus on the one that prohibits paid prioritization of content. We develop a model of the Internet ecosystem in terms of three primary players: consumers, ISPs, and content providers. We analyze this issue from the point of view of the consumer and target the desired system state that maximizes consumer utility. By analyzing various structures of an ISP market, we obtain different conclusions on the desirability of regulation. We also introduce the notion of a Public Option ISP, an ISP that carries traffic in a network-neutral manner. We find: 1) in a monopolistic scenario, network-neutral regulations might benefit consumers, however the introduction of a Public Option ISP is even better as it aligns the interests of the monopolistic ISP with the consumer utility; and 2) in an oligopolistic scenario, the presence of a Public Option ISP is again preferable to network-neutral regulations, although the presence of competing nonneutral ISPs provides the most desirable situation for the consumers.