A digital signature scheme secure against adaptive chosen-message attacks
SIAM Journal on Computing - Special issue on cryptography
How to withstand mobile virus attacks (extended abstract)
PODC '91 Proceedings of the tenth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Reaching Agreement in the Presence of Faults
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
From partial consistency to global broadcast
STOC '00 Proceedings of the thirty-second annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The Byzantine Generals Problem
ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS)
Authenticated Byzantine generals in dual failure model
ICDCN'10 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Distributed computing and networking
Player-centric Byzantine agreement
ICALP'11 Proceedings of the 38th international colloquim conference on Automata, languages and programming - Volume Part I
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Given a public-key infrastructure (PKI) and digital signatures, it is possible to construct broadcast protocols tolerating any number of corrupted parties. Existing protocols, however, do not distinguish between corrupted parties who do not follow the protocol, and honest parties whose secret (signing) keys have been compromised but continue to behave honestly. We explore conditions under which it is possible to construct broadcast protocols that still provide the usual guarantees (i.e., validity/agreement) to the latter. Consider a network of n parties, where an adversary has compromised the secret keys of up to t"c honest parties and, in addition, fully controls the behavior of up to t"a other parties. We show that for any fixed t"c0 and any fixed t"a, there exists an efficient protocol for broadcast if and only if 2t"a+min(t"a,t"c)