Existence of a pure strategy equilibrium in finite symmetric games where payoff functions are integrally concave

Authors:
Takuya Iimura;Takahiro Watanabe
Affiliations:
-;-
Venue:
Discrete Applied Mathematics
Year:
2014

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Abstract

In this paper we show that a finite symmetric game has a pure strategy equilibrium if the payoff functions of players are integrally concave due to Favati and Tardella (1990). Since the payoff functions of any two-strategy game are integrally concave, this generalizes the result of Cheng et al. (2004). A simple algorithm to find a pure strategy equilibrium is also provided.