Stable internet routing without global coordination
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Sink Equilibria and Convergence
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Incentive-compatible interdomain routing
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Congestion games with malicious players
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
The complexity of game dynamics: BGP oscillations, sink equilibria, and beyond
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
STOC '08 Proceedings of the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Rationality and traffic attraction: incentives for honest path announcements in bgp
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2008 conference on Data communication
Fault Tolerance in Distributed Mechanism Design
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
On the complexity of nash dynamics and sink equilibria
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Payoff-Based Dynamics for Multiplayer Weakly Acyclic Games
SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization
On the structure of weakly acyclic games
SAGT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
On the existence of pure strategy nash equilibria in integer-splittable weighted congestion games
SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
A classification of weakly acyclic games
SAGT'12 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Algorithmic Game Theory
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Weakly-acyclic games--a superclass of potential games--capture distributed environments where simple, globally-asynchronous interactions between strategic agents are guaranteed to converge to an equilibrium. We explore the class of routing games introduced in Fabrikant and Papadimitriou (The Complexity of Game Dynamics: BGP Oscillations, Sink Equilibria, and Beyond, pp. 844---853, 2008) and in Levin et al. (Interdomain Routing and Games, pp. 57---66, 2008), which models important aspects of routing on the Internet. We show that, in interesting contexts, such routing games are weakly acyclic and, moreover, that pure Nash equilibria in such games can be found in a computationally efficient manner.