Insecurity of an efficient certificateless aggregate signature with constant pairing computations

Authors:
Debiao He;Miaomiao Tian;Jianhua Chen
Affiliations:
School of Mathematics and Statistics, Wuhan University, Wuhan, China;School of Computer Science and Technology, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, China;School of Mathematics and Statistics, Wuhan University, Wuhan, China
Venue:
Information Sciences: an International Journal
Year:
2014

Citing 6
Cited 0

Identity-based cryptosystems and signature schemes

Proceedings of CRYPTO 84 on Advances in cryptology
Two Certificateless Aggregate Signatures From Bilinear Maps

SNPD '07 Proceedings of the Eighth ACIS International Conference on Software Engineering, Artificial Intelligence, Networking, and Parallel/Distributed Computing - Volume 03
A new certificateless aggregate signature scheme

Computer Communications
Aggregate and verifiably encrypted signatures from bilinear maps

EUROCRYPT'03 Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on Theory and applications of cryptographic techniques
Efficient many-to-one authentication with certificateless aggregate signatures

Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
An efficient certificateless aggregate signature with constant pairing computations

Information Sciences: an International Journal

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.07

Visualization

Abstract

Recently, Xiong et al. [H. Xiong, Z. Guan, Z. Chen, F. Li, An efficient certificateless aggregate signature with constant pairing computations, Information Science 219 (2013) 225-235] proposed a certificateless signature (CLS) scheme and used it to construct a certificateless aggregate signature (CLAS) scheme with constant pairing computations. They demonstrated that both of their schemes are provably secure in the random oracle model under the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption. Unfortunately, by giving concrete attack, we demonstrate that their schemes are not secure against the Type II adversary, i.e. a Type II adversary could forge a legal signature of any message.