Encouraging Cooperation in Sharing Supermodular Costs
APPROX '07/RANDOM '07 Proceedings of the 10th International Workshop on Approximation and the 11th International Workshop on Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques
Improved taxation rate for bin packing games
TAPAS'11 Proceedings of the First international ICST conference on Theory and practice of algorithms in (computer) systems
Complexity of core allocation for the bin packing game
Operations Research Letters
Note on non-uniform bin packing games
Discrete Applied Mathematics
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A binpacking game is a cooperative N-person game, where the set of players consists of k bins of size 1 and n items of sizes a1,..., an. The value of a coalition of bins and items is the maximum total size of items in the coalition that can be packed into the bins of the coalition. Our main result asserts that for every $\epsilon 0$, there exist $\epsilon$-approximate core allocations provided k is large enough. Moreover, for every fixed $\delta 0$, the smallest $\epsilon$ for which the $\epsilon$-approximate core of a given binpacking game is nonempty can be computed in polynomial time with error at most $\delta$, provided k is sufficiently large. We furthermore derive more specialized results for some subclasses of binpacking games.