Proceedings of the 24th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
From system F to typed assembly language
POPL '98 Proceedings of the 25th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Java Virtual Machine Specification
Java Virtual Machine Specification
How to Formally Specify the Java Bytecode Semantivs Using the B Method
Proceedings of the Workshop on Object-Oriented Technology
Data flow analysis for verifying correctness properties of concurrent programs
Data flow analysis for verifying correctness properties of concurrent programs
Typed common intermediate format
DSL'97 Proceedings of the Conference on Domain-Specific Languages on Conference on Domain-Specific Languages (DSL), 1997
Bytecode verification on Java smart cards
Software—Practice & Experience
On-Card Bytecode Verification for Java Card
E-SMART '01 Proceedings of the International Conference on Research in Smart Cards: Smart Card Programming and Security
Are Smart Cards the Ideal Domain for Applying Formal Methods?
ZB '00 Proceedings of the First International Conference of B and Z Users on Formal Specification and Development in Z and B
Building an "impossible" verifier on a java card
WIESS'02 Proceedings of the 2nd conference on Industrial Experiences with Systems Software - Volume 2
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The use of smart cards to run software modules on demand has become a major business concern for application issuers. Such down-loadable executable content needs to be trusted by the card execution environment in order to ensure that an instruction on a memory area is compliant with the definition of the data stored in this area (i.e. its type). Current solutions for smart cards rely on three techniques. For Java Card, either an off-card verifier-converter performs a static verification of type-safety, or a defensive virtual machine performs the verification at runtime. For other types of open smart cards, no type-checking is carried out and the trust is only based on the containment of applications. Static verification is more efficient and flexible than dynamic techniques. Nevertheless, as the Java verifier cannot fit into a card, the trust is dependent on an external third-party. In this way, the card security has been partly turned to the outside. We propose and describe the FACADE language for which the type-safety verification can be performed statically on-card.